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UNJUST ENRICHMENT, LEAPFROGGING, AND A DEFENCE OF ENTITLEMENT 
Nathan Tamblyn1 
 
This article argues that a defence of entitlement should be recognized in the law of unjust 
enrichment, consistently with the case law and sound principle, and in mutual support of a rule 
against leapfrogging. In so doing, this article also explores the relationship between unjust 
enrichment and contract. 
 




If you pay someone under a contract, and get nothing of what was promised in return, should you 
get your money back? If you give someone a generous gift, but only because they exerted an 
undue influence over you, should you get your money back? If you pay too much tax by mistake, 
should you get the extra money back? If the answer is yes, then the mechanism is the law of 
unjust enrichment, and that is why we have it. 
 We did not always have it. Once upon a time, problems now addressed directly by the 
law of unjust enrichment tended to be fudged through an unconvincing application of contract 
law. For example, if A paid B money by mistake, the law implied a promise by B to repay the 
                                                          
1 MA (Oxford) LLM PhD (Cambridge) Barrister; Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter 
money, and A could sue upon that implied promise. No doubt in most cases B should have 
repaid the money, but the promise to repay it was pure fiction, and objectionable on that basis 
alone. This approach, sometimes called implied contract theory, or in similar circumstances 
called quasi-contract, 2  imposed the regime of contract law, but inappropriately because no 
contract was ever agreed. It was the unhappy but necessary consequence of formulaic pleading 
practices and constrictive litigation processes which have long since gone.  
The implied contract theory has now been judicially disapproved. 3  Instead, unjust 
enrichment has been recognized as a cause of action in its own right.4 In general terms, unjust 
enrichment concerns basic rights which we get for free, and basic duties which we must comply 
with whether we like it or not. In this regard, it is more like tort than contract; with contract, 
extra rights must generally be bought with consideration, and duties are usually only binding if 
we agree to them.  
Again in general terms, the law of unjust enrichment says that if you behave unjustly, and 
profit at my expense, then you will have to hand that profit over to me, your victim. It is not all 
unjust conduct which the law penalizes in this way. Similarly, it is not all unreasonable conduct 
which sounds in tort, and not all promises which result in a contract. Unjust enrichment only 
applies to those types of unjust conduct which the law recognizes as sufficiently serious to 
warrant intervention.  
More specifically, what a plaintiff needs to show in order to found a cause of action in 
unjust enrichment is as follows: that the defendant has been enriched; at the expense of plaintiff; 
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through a recognized unjust factor. After that, the defendant may be able to raise a defence.5 If 
successful, the plaintiff will recover, in money, the enrichment which the defendant made at his 
expense. (Alternatively, in some cases, unjust enrichment might yield a subrogation remedy.6) 
One of the recognized defences to unjust enrichment is called change of position (we 
shall come across this again later). It applies where the defendant’s position has changed as a 
result of his receipt such that it would be inequitable to require him to make restitution.7 
There used to be discussion about whether unjust enrichment and restitution are the same 
thing. The terms were sometimes used interchangeably. The better approach, and standard 
modern practice, is to call the remedy restitution and the cause of action unjust enrichment. 
Restitutionary damages are also available in contract, tort and equity, but they tend to be rare. 
For example, restitutionary damages are available only exceptionally for breach of contract, at 
the discretion of the court, where the usual remedies of compensatory damages and specific 
performance are not adequate, and where the plaintiff has a legitimate interest in preventing the 
defendant’s profit-earning activity.8 Whereas in unjust enrichment, restitutionary damages are 
available as of right. 
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Despite the death of implied contract theory, there is still a strong relationship between 
contract and unjust enrichment. Duress, undue influence, and unconscionable conduct can vitiate 
a contract; they are also recognized unjust factors. Mistake and misrepresentation can vitiate a 
contract; mistake is a recognized unjust factor (including those induced mistakes which would 
otherwise be called misrepresentation in contract law). A total failure to perform what was 
promised is a repudiatory breach of contract; that scenario also engages the unjust factor inaptly 
but commonly known as “total failure of consideration”. 
This overlap between contract and unjust enrichment is no doubt partly a legacy of the 
fact that the principles of unjust enrichment were developed latently within the confines of 
implied or quasi-contract. Regardless, it should not be surprising that conduct condemned and 
remedied in one area of law similarly finds remedies in other areas too. For example, tort law 
also recognizes pleas of duress and misrepresentation. But unjust enrichment is also broader than 
the shadow of contract law. We have already seen how restitutionary damages are exceptional in 
contract, but available as of right in unjust enrichment. Further, total failure of consideration 
applies not just to unfulfilled promises, but also to unfulfilled legitimate expectations which fall 
short of contract.9 What is more, money can be recovered in unjust enrichment when it was paid 
under legal compulsion, 10  or pursuant to an illegal activity from which the plaintiff has 
withdrawn,11 or in consequence of a public authority acting ultra vires.12 And there is academic 
debate as to whether ignorance and necessity should also be recognized as unjust factors 
(although my view is no). 
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Because unjust enrichment is relatively young as a cause of action, there are further 
controversies besides which unjust factors should be recognized. There is academic debate over 
whether unjust enrichment can yield proprietary remedies or invoke tracing (again my view is 
no). And there remains discussion about the possibility of leapfrogging. For example, A 
contracts with B who contracts with C, with the effect that A provides services directly to C. If B 
does not pay A under the A / B contract, can A leapfrog B and sue C in unjust enrichment? 
This article argues in favour of recognizing an additional defence to a claim in unjust 
enrichment: a defence of entitlement. Put simply, a plaintiff cannot complain that a defendant’s 
enrichment was unjust if the defendant was legally entitled to his receipt, for example because it 
was promised him under a contract or ordered by the court. A defence of entitlement has not yet 
been recognized by the courts, but it should be. First, the case law is consistent with, indeed best 
explained by, such a defence. Second, there is good reason in principle for the defence, and this 
is increasingly recognized by other scholars, albeit not in the same terms as argued for here. 
Further, this article also argues that a general rule against leapfrogging, which is well attested in 
the case law, stands in a position of mutual support with a defence of entitlement. What is more, 
by exploring the justifications for a defence of entitlement, we are also led to a clearer 
understanding of the relationship between unjust enrichment and contract. 
 
II. A DEFENCE OF ENTITLEMENT 
 
A defence of entitlement is consistent with the case law. Although the defence has not yet been 
recognized, there are a number of dicta which support it. For example, the courts have held that 
there is no obligation to make restitution where money is paid under a “legally effective 
transaction”;13 that a payee cannot be said to be unjustly enriched if he was “entitled to receive” 
the sum paid to him;14 that there can be no recovery of mistaken payments if the money was paid 
for “good consideration”.15  
This last phrase needs unpacking. Paying money for “good consideration” means paying 
money under a contract. It expresses the idea that there can be no restitutionary recovery of 
money when the defendant was entitled to receive it under an effective contract. Indeed, the case 
law tends to suggest that the notion of good consideration and legal entitlement are 
interchangeable.16 But we would do better to adopt the language of entitlement, and abandon the 
language of consideration, for two main reasons. First, the language of consideration tends to 
hark back to the time when unjust enrichment was still viewed as quasi-contract, when instead it 
is now its own independent cause of action, free from the fetters of formulaic pleading and 
implied but fictional contractual regimes. Second, as we have seen, unjust enrichment as a cause 
of action is broader than the shadow of contract law. So too the defence of entitlement extends 
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beyond contractual entitlement, as we shall see below. It is therefore unhelpful to phrase the 
defence by reference only to contract.17 
A defence of entitlement is not only consistent with the case law, it can explain it too. For 
example, a plaintiff cannot sue in unjust enrichment for the value of his services (ie quantum 
meruit) where the price is fixed by a contract.18 This is because the defendant is entitled to 
receive those services at that price and on those terms. So too where a sailor died shortly before 
reaching the ship’s destination, his wife could not sue for the value of his services when the 
contract provided that he would be paid only if he completed the whole voyage.19 In other words, 
the defendant was contractually entitled to receive part performance without payment (the risk of 
only part performance had been taken contractually by the sailor).  
A defence of entitlement is consistent with the trend of scholarly discussion, albeit that it 
uses different language. For example, Virgo talks about a “presence of basis bar” to unjust 
enrichment.20 Burrows talks about legal entitlement being a “qualification” such that enrichment 
is not overall unjust. 21  Tettenborn, 22  and the editors of Goff & Jones, 23  discuss “justifying 
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grounds” which give the defendant a legal entitlement to keep what he has received despite 
unjust enrichment otherwise being made out.  
All of these approaches are grounded in the simple but important point that a defendant 
cannot be described as unjustly enriched if he was legally entitled to his receipt. Nevertheless, 
this simple point is best served by using the language of entitlement, and for it to be recognized 
as a defence. The language of “presence of basis” is obscure; the “basis” which bars the cause of 
action appears to be precisely the fact that the defendant was entitled to his receipt. Similarly, 
what makes “justifying grounds” justified is again precisely the fact that the defendant was 
entitled to his receipt. And when it comes to “bars” to restitution, or “justifying grounds” for 
receipt, or “qualifications” which make enrichments not unjust, it is not immediately clear 
whether a claimant is obliged to disprove them, or whether this is a matter to be raised, or proven, 
by the defendant. At what point do these considerations arise in any analysis? Instead, 
recognizing entitlement as a defence gives it a clear role to play in the structure of any litigation 
or analysis, and so helps ensure that the simple point it encapsulates does not risk getting lost for 
want of any formal position. It also represents the natural order of the argument: the plaintiff 
proves his cause of action, demanding the return of the money; then the defendant proves that he 
is entitled to keep it anyway. 
Further, it is not simply that a defence of entitlement gives honest expression to the 
intuitive but forceful claim that a defendant is not unjustly enriched when legally entitled to his 
receipt. The defence also achieves a result which is consistent in theory, both with other 
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approaches already recognized within unjust enrichment, and with the interplay between unjust 
enrichment and contract. More than that, a defence of entitlement consolidates these disparate 
other approaches, bringing them together into one neat package. It can thus claim a cohering and 
tidying effect. 
To see this, let us assume a P / D contract pursuant to which P has promised to pay $100 
to D. P pays the money. P now wants to recover the money in unjust enrichment. Perhaps P paid 
the money by mistake, for example through administrative oversight, not intending to pay the 
money at this time. This would be sufficient to found a cause of action in unjust enrichment 
(such a mistake being a recognized unjust factor). 24  Thereafter, there are a number of 
possibilities.  
First, if P does recover the money, then D might sue under the P / D contract, because he 
was promised the money, yet now he does not have it. In which case, any success P might enjoy 
in recovering the money in unjust enrichment would be quickly undone by D’s successful 
counterclaim for breach of contract.  
Second, perhaps it might be argued that D could not sue under the P / D contract, on the 
basis that P’s original payment fulfilled the P / D contract, thus rendering the contract spent, with 
no further remaining contractual rights or duties. Of course, there would be something very 
wrong if P could discharge his obligations by paying the money, only to recover the money later. 
It looks a bit like the old joke of paying at a vending machine with a coin on a string, yanking the 
coin back out once the vending machine has registered the order and delivered the goods. As a 
matter of theory, how can this result be precluded? One answer is to invoke the recognized 
defence in unjust enrichment of change of position: as a consequence of P’s original payment, 
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D’s position has changed, because his contractual right against P has been extinguished by P’s 
performance, thus making it inequitable for P to recover the money, leaving D now without 
either money or contractual right to sue for it.25 Thus the defence stops P from recovering the 
money in the first place. 
Third, an alternative way of reaching that same result is to turn to the necessary element 
in any claim of unjust enrichment, namely, that the defendant be enriched. It seems 
straightforward to say that D is enriched by the money he receives from P. But Edelman and 
Bant suggest otherwise. They say that a defendant in such a position is never enriched: he merely 
exchanges one asset (the contractual right to payment) for another asset (the payment itself).26 If 
D is not enriched after all, then P has no claim in unjust enrichment. 
A defence of entitlement tidily draws all of these otherwise parallel possibilities together. 
It internalizes these arguments into a neat package. P cannot recover the payment because D was 
entitled under the contract to receive the money and keep it. 
If P wishes to be successful, and avoid any defence of entitlement, then he must set aside 
the contract. That would then mean that D could not counterclaim for breach of contract, because 
there would be no contract to breach. It would also mean that D could not invoke a defence of 
change of position: if the contract is set aside, for that reason he legitimately loses his contractual 
right to sue, and not consequent to P’s payment. And it would mean that D was enriched after all, 
receiving the money without giving up in exchange any contractual right to it, because he no 
longer has any such contractual right to give up. Put shortly, if the contract is set aside, D cannot 
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plead that he was entitled to the receipt. All of which further explains why it has been tentatively 
recognized in the case law that, before a plaintiff can bring a claim in unjust enrichment, he must 
first disable any contract with the defendant which applies to the transaction,27 or perhaps at least 
disable the severable part of the contract which applies to the transaction.28 
The need to set aside an underlying contract must be stressed. Consider the following 
example: A sells his property to B at an undervalue. This is something which happens very often, 
to a greater or lesser extent. There appears to be nothing preventing A from setting up a claim in 
unjust enrichment. After all, B was enriched by the difference between the sale price and the 
property’s true worth, at the expense of A, who can invoke the recognized unjust factor of 
mistake (A got the price wrong). But economic reality is that we allow people like B to make 
such profits; capitalism permits B to benefit from his superior knowledge, or simply to cash in on 
a lucky opportunity. We do not re-open every contract of sale just because the seller later realizes 
he could have charged more. So what in theory stops A from recovering the missing value in 
unjust enrichment? The answer is a defence of entitlement: B is contractually entitled to receive 
the property at that price. If A wishes to recover the price differential, A must first set aside the 
contract of sale. And contract law only allows contracts to be set aside in a narrow range of 
circumstances. In particular, mistake is a very narrow doctrine in contract law, and would not 
avail A in circumstances as plain as these. 
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A defence of entitlement is not limited to contractual entitlement. It has the power to 
explain the case law more widely. Thus a defendant is entitled to his receipt where it was ordered 
to be paid him by a court judgment. It does not matter that the judgment proceeded upon a 
mistake; if the judgment is not set aside or appealed, then it remains valid, and so too does the 
defendant’s entitlement to receive payment under it.29 Also, a plaintiff cannot recover tax which 
the Revenue was entitled to receive, even if the plaintiff might otherwise have reduced its tax 
liability were it not for an earlier mistake (even an earlier mistake of the Revenue).30 
In cases like these last two, the analysis is similar to contractual entitlement. If the 
plaintiff recovered in unjust enrichment, that might be undone by the defendant counterclaiming 
to enforce the judgment or the tax demand. Or, if the defendant cannot counterclaim because the 
judgment or tax demand has been fulfilled and so extinguished, that might raise a defence of 
change of position. Or the defendant is not enriched anyway where it merely exchanges one asset 
(the judgment or tax debt) for another asset (the payment itself). Again, all of these parallel 
arguments are consolidated in the defence of entitlement. For the plaintiff to avoid that defence, 
the entitlement (ie the judgment or tax demand) must be set aside – just as any contract must be 
set aside. 
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III. THE RULE AGAINST LEAPFROGGING 
 
A transacts with B who transacts with C. The goods or services flow down the chain. If A goes 
unpaid, can A leapfrog B to sue C? This might be possible in a number of situations. First, A 
might be able to rely upon the laws of agency. But this can avail a plaintiff across a number of 
causes of action, and is nothing unique to unjust enrichment, so we shall not consider it further. 
Second, A might have a proprietary remedy which follows his property into the hands of C; or A 
might invoke the rules of tracing. But this has nothing to do with unjust enrichment either, if we 
accept the better view that unjust enrichment does not have proprietary remedies, and cannot 
invoke the rules of tracing.31 Third, C might have committed some wrong against A which 
entitles A to sue him directly. This might allow for restitutionary remedies, but again it takes the 
matter outside of unjust enrichment. Fourth, the remedy of subrogation might put A into B’s 
shoes and thus in a position to sue C. This can be compatible with unjust enrichment, but it is not 
a common solution. So let us put subrogation to one side, as a special case, and consider instead 
what remains of the general principle of whether A can leapfrog B to sue C in unjust enrichment. 
 The courts have repeatedly recognized a general rule against leapfrogging in unjust 
enrichment, insisting that the parties must be in a direct relationship,32 although more recently 
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there has been a softening of approach.33 The general rule against leapfrogging can be justified 
by analogy to other familiar concepts in the law of obligations. In the tort of negligence there is a 
requirement of proximity. In contract there is a requirement of privity. In both there are further 
requirements of causation and remoteness. All of these concepts are rolled together in the 
necessary ingredient that any unjust enrichment be “at the expense of” the plaintiff – and that 
means at his direct expense. 
 For example, assume that A contracts with B who contracts with C, so that goods flow 
down the chain to C. If A is not paid by B, nevertheless the general rule against leapfrogging 
means that A cannot C sue in unjust enrichment. We could explain this in a number of ways. We 
might say that C is enriched only at the expense of C, who is liable to pay B under the B / C 
contract. Or we might say that C is enriched at the expense of B, who is liable to pay A under the 
A / B contract. C’s enrichment at the expense of A is at a third remove, which is too remote, or 
lacks proximity or privity, 34  or it means that B’s intermediary role breaks the chain of 
causation.35 As a further alternative, C might be able to invoke a change of position defence: as a 
consequence of its receipt from A, C has incurred a liability to pay B under the B / C contract, 
while at the same time C’s rights against B have been extinguished through B’s performance in 
providing or procuring the goods for C.36  
So already we have a number of familiar ways of justifying a rule against leapfrogging. 
We can now add a further approach: a defence of entitlement. Where A contracts with B who 
contracts with C, so that goods or services flow down the chain, C is entitled to the receipt under 
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the terms of the B / C contract, and these might preclude A from suing C. This approach is an 
attractive and preferable addition for a number of reasons.  
First, a defence of entitlement remains consistent with the case law (here, the case law 
against leapfrogging). By way of further example, charterers A hired a ship from owners B who 
assigned the right to receive hire to credit agency C. A made advance hire payments to C. The 
ship went off-hire while undergoing repairs, and could not return to service thereafter. A sought 
to recover the hire from C. The court held that A could only recover under the charter party from 
B. C was entitled to the hire under the B / C contract on terms which precluded any recourse by 
A.37 
Similarly, builders A were sub-contracted to B who contracted with head builders C. B 
became insolvent. A could not sue C for the value of its work. This would otherwise side-step 
the insolvency regime: instead of C paying B, with that then shared rateably among B’s creditors, 
including A, A would otherwise claim the money from C all for itself and in priority. But what is 
more, C was not enriched unjustly: C was entitled to receive the work on terms which obliged it 
to pay B only.38 
Second, a defence of entitlement renders unjust enrichment more coherent, in two ways. 
Again it consolidates the law, drawing together into one neat package the various disparate 
approaches to the rule against leapfrogging. Also, it provides a single defence which applies 
across both two-party and three-party scenarios: A will have a defence of entitlement against any 
claim in unjust enrichment by B or C. Altogether this makes for a tidier analysis, without A 
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having to rely upon a number of different, if sometimes overlapping, approaches as against each 
separate party. 
Third, a defence of entitlement is consistent with the position, adopted by scholars and 
the court, that A should not be able to leapfrog out of any contractual scheme.39 After all, A has 
taken the contractual risk of looking only to B for payment, while C has taken the contractual 
risk of looking only to B for performance. C cannot sue A for non-performance. So why should 
A be able to sue C for payment? A defence of (contractual) entitlement meets this point head on, 
and thus openly and honestly, rather than achieving the result circuitously through a variety of 
indirect approaches. 
Finally, it is worth remembering that a defence of entitlement is not limited to contractual 
entitlement. C may be entitled to the receipt for other reasons, perhaps because B was ordered by 
the court to provide the enrichment to C, or because B was obliged to do so by statute (as in the 
case of a tax demand) – or perhaps even because B has gifted the enrichment to C. The defence 
of entitlement prevents A, not simply from undermining any contractual regime, but also from 
subverting other lawful arrangements which affect B and C. This stops unjust enrichment from 
becoming too wide. Otherwise every B / C transaction would risk being re-opened by third party 
A (and by how many other parties further up the chain as well?). Any claim in unjust enrichment 
can only succeed if C’s entitlement can be set aside, and it will be a very rare case when a third 
party can manage that.40 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
It is time to recognize a defence of entitlement: a defendant is not obliged to make restitution for 
any receipt he was legally entitled to, whether that entitlement was provided by a contract or in 
any other way. In order for a plaintiff to succeed in unjust enrichment, any such entitlement must 
first be set aside.  
Such a defence is consistent with and explains the case law. It is consistent with the trend 
of scholarly discussion, but achieves the desired result more directly and obviously. It is 
explicable through (and so further consistent with) a range of different techniques already known 
to the law of obligations more generally, or recognized particularly within unjust enrichment, 
including the rule against leapfrogging. And yet it consolidates that diversity of disparate 
approaches into one straightforward argument. In doing so, it renders unjust enrichment more 
coherent, by providing a single defence in place of multiple arguments, and across both two-
party and three-party scenarios. And all the while it is founded on a very simple but forceful 
justification which further renders the law intuitively intelligible: a defendant cannot be 
described as unjustly enriched when he was legally entitled to what he received. 
